Foundations of Justice: The Eight Immutable Principles of American Law and Governance
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Declaration of Restoration
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Raskin, Trump, and the Forgotten Constitution: Are We Missing the Real Insurrection?
Raskin, Trump, and the Forgotten Constitution: Are We Missing the Real Insurrection? By Ronald P. Bouchard Jr. The January 6th events at the Capitol remain a focal point in political debates, particularly following Rep. Jamie Raskin’s recent comments advocating Trump’s disqualification from the ballot under charges of insurrection. Raskin has criticized the Supreme Court, asserting that it “failed” to disqualify Trump, whom he believes unfit for office based on allegations connected to January 6th. However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Trump v. United States clarified the extent of presidential immunity, ruling that Trump is shielded from prosecution for official acts within the scope of his presidential duties. This ruling suggests that the Court views certain executive actions, even those that might indirectly influence political or electoral processes, as protected under the doctrine of executive immunity. As we examine the constitutional process set for January 6th, including the lawful objection and debate procedure under the 12th Amendment, Raskin’s call for disqualification prompts further questions: Would disrupting the certification process—an avenue that could have validated claims of election irregularities—have served Trump’s interests? And does the evidence support the label of insurrection? In light of the Court’s reaffirmation of the boundaries of presidential authority and immunity, these issues demand a rigorous analysis, especially given the complex balance the Court seeks to maintain between executive power and accountability. What is January 6th? A Day in the Constitution That’s Bigger Than 2020 Every four years, January 6th marks an essential date in the U.S. electoral process. On this day, Congress meets in a joint session to count and certify each state’s Electoral College votes, finalizing the presidential election results. This certification process is established by the 12th Amendment, which mandates that Congress convene with the Vice President presiding over the vote count in his role as President of the Senate. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to certify these votes and includes a formal review process for members to raise concerns about electoral irregularities. In this process, members of Congress can submit objections to any state’s electoral votes. Objections must be in writing and endorsed by at least one member from each chamber—the House and the Senate. Once an objection meets these requirements, the joint session pauses, and the House and Senate separate to debate and vote on the objection. The Electoral Count Act of 1887 further refines this procedure, allowing up to two hours of debate per objection, ensuring that each chamber has adequate time to discuss any concerns. This act also sets strict procedural limits, maintaining an orderly and lawful certification process. This process is rooted in constitutional law and must be followed exactly. As legal maxims dictate, “When the law prescribes a method, that method, and no other, must be followed.” Any deviation from this constitutionally mandated procedure is unlawful, as the government’s authority is bound by constitutional and legal provisions. Strict adherence to this process on January 6th every four years reinforces both the stability and legitimacy of the U.S. electoral system, a reminder that lawful process is fundamental to a free republic. Did Any Members of Congress Meet the Criterion for Objection? The certification process was set to unfold as planned on January 6th. Members of Congress, including Sen. Ted Cruz and Rep. Mo Brooks, had announced in advance their intent to raise concerns about electoral irregularities, satisfying the 12th Amendment’s requirements. This structured debate could have provided Congress with an opportunity to address these concerns in a lawful setting—a vital aspect often overlooked in the heated rhetoric surrounding January 6th. The objection process could have provided a transparent venue to examine the electoral process, giving voice to concerns and offering clarity. Ironically, the violence that erupted that day disrupted the very process that could have validated Trump’s claims or, at minimum, provided a lawful forum for election concerns. The Brunson case, which is currently under consideration by the Supreme Court, directly addresses this missed opportunity. The Brunson brothers argue that Congress neglected its duty on January 6th by not thoroughly investigating election integrity concerns raised by certain members of Congress and by millions of citizens. By failing to allow a complete review, they contend that Congress deviated from its constitutional responsibility, violating the rule of law. This case asserts that Congress is required to follow constitutional procedure precisely, particularly when the election’s integrity is questioned. The plaintiffs argue that any deviation is a serious breach, threatening the foundation of lawful government. If the Court takes up the case and rules in favor of the Brunsons, it could set a powerful precedent, clarifying Congress’s duty to investigate objections fully and reinforcing the maxim that “That which is done contrary to law is regarded as not done at all.” What Could Trump Gain from a Complete Constitutional Process? Had the January 6th process continued without disruption, Trump’s supporters would have had the opportunity to formally raise objections, creating a public forum for addressing election integrity concerns. This structured debate could have brought specific issues to light, such as procedural changes made without legislative approval in Pennsylvania, inconsistent voter ID and signature verification standards in Georgia, and claims of unequal treatment of voters across counties in Michigan and Wisconsin. The potential for transparency and accountability in this process aligns with John Locke’s assertion in Second Treatise of Government, §216: “When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered.” Locke believed that unauthorized changes to election processes compromise the legitimacy of the government. Allowing the constitutional process to unfold could have offered Trump and his supporters the lawful setting needed to present their case, potentially lending credibility to their claims. Given the potential benefits of a structured debate, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that Trump would seek to disrupt a process that offered an opportunity for his concerns to be addressed openly. What Would Trump Lose
The Unchanging Meaning of ‘Natural Born Citizen’: A Constitutional Perspective
Download the Kamala Harris Affidavit & Estoppel Please take notice that this lawful notification outlines the constitutional ineligibility and maladministration regarding Kamala Devi Harris’s candidacy for President. This document is provided for your personal review, use, and distribution as part of your effort to hold public officials accountable under the law. Click below to download the full affidavit and estoppel notice. Click Here The words and phrases enshrined in the U.S. Constitution hold a timeless quality, their meanings meticulously chosen by the Founding Fathers. These definitions were not arbitrary but rooted in well-established principles of law and governance, designed to endure through the ages. One such term, “Natural Born Citizen,” as mentioned in Article 2, has been the subject of much debate in modern times. However, a closer examination of historical context and legal foundations reveals a steadfast definition that remains unaltered since the Constitution’s creation. The Founding Fathers drew significant inspiration from The Law of Nations when crafting the Constitution and defining the powers of the new nation. The Law of Nations, a comprehensive legal treatise by Emer de Vattel published in 1758, was a cornerstone in the Founders’ understanding of international law, sovereignty, and citizenship. Vattel’s work was not merely influential; it was one of the primary sources that shaped the legal terminology and principles embedded in the Constitution. The term “Natural Born Citizen” finds its definitive clarity in The Law of Nations. Vattel explicitly defined a “natural-born citizen” as one born in the country to citizen parents, a definition that was well understood and accepted during the drafting of the Constitution. This understanding is not just inferred but directly referenced in the Constitution itself. Article 1, Section 8 grants Congress the power to define and punish offenses against the Law of Nations, implicitly acknowledging its principles as foundational to the new American legal system. Vattel’s precise wording in The Law of Nations (§ 212) leaves no room for ambiguity: Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations § 212 (T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1852). “The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.” This definition was not only well-known but was the only source available at the time that offered such a detailed explanation of what it meant to be a “natural-born citizen.” The Founding Fathers, including figures like George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson, frequently referenced Vattel’s work when framing the Constitution. This is further evidenced by John Jay’s correspondence with George Washington, where he stressed the necessity of ensuring that only a “Natural Born Citizen” could hold the office of President to prevent foreign influence. Moreover, Vattel’s influence extended beyond the drafting of the Constitution and into the judicial interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court. Over the years, the Supreme Court has referenced Vattel’s work in dozens of rulings to define key constitutional principles and terms. For example: Chisholm v. Georgia (1793): The Supreme Court referenced Vattel to articulate principles of state sovereignty and the law of nations, which were foundational in determining the relationship between states and the federal government. The Paquete Habana (1900): This case relied on The Law of Nations to affirm that international law is part of U.S. law, emphasizing the relevance of Vattel’s principles in the American legal system. Ware v. Hylton (1796): Vattel’s views on treaties and international obligations were cited, underscoring his influence on how the Supreme Court interpreted treaty obligations under the Constitution. Talbot v. Janson (1795): The Court used Vattel’s definitions of citizenship and allegiance to resolve questions of dual nationality and expatriation. These cases demonstrate that the principles set forth in The Law of Nations were not merely theoretical but were actively applied by the highest court in the land to interpret the Constitution and guide legal decisions. To further support the argument that the term “natural born citizen” has consistently been understood within the framework set forth by Vattel, it’s essential to highlight that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this interpretation in key rulings. Specifically, the Court has applied the term “natural born citizen” exclusively to individuals born in the country to parents who are citizens thereof, aligning directly with Vattel’s definition as stated in The Law of Nations. The following Supreme Court cases illustrate this consistent interpretation: Minor v. Happersett (1875): The Court explicitly stated that “natural-born citizens are those born in the country of parents who are its citizens,” directly echoing Vattel’s definition. This ruling confirmed that the understanding of “natural born citizen” was well-established and had not been expanded to include other categories. The Venus (1814): Justice John Marshall cited Vattel directly, emphasizing that those who are born in the country to parents who are citizens are the true “natural born citizens.” This case reinforced the strict interpretation of the term as it relates to eligibility for the presidency. Shanks v. Dupont (1830): The Court again referred to Vattel’s definition of citizenship to resolve issues of allegiance and natural-born status, affirming that a “natural born citizen” must be born within the jurisdiction of the United States to citizen parents. Wong Kim Ark (1898): While this case focused on the status of children born in the U.S. to non-citizen parents, the Court made a clear distinction between “citizens at birth” under the 14th Amendment and “natural born citizens” eligible for the presidency, reserving the latter term for those born to citizen parents. These cases collectively demonstrate that the definition of “natural born citizen” as articulated by Vattel has been not only recognized but also consistently upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Founding Fathers’ reliance on Vattel’s work, combined with the judiciary’s adherence to this interpretation, underscores the original intent behind the constitutional requirement for presidential eligibility and the exclusion of any broader definition
Upholding the Sanctity of Life: The Constitutional and Moral Imperative Against Abortion
Things which are forbidden by the nature of things are confirmed by no law,” which implies that laws contradicting natural law lack legitimacy.